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of Africa, which is history. Then he notes the treatment of the Belgians by Germany, and does not fail to see the grim justice of Belgium's punishment. Reading more than history, he finds it recorded, "They who take the sword perish by it."

The encouragement of conflict, moral and physical, is what delays the rule of love and the practice of brotherhood. Conflict is encouraged by all those who consider it the only way to achieve human progress. It is no argument against non-resistance to point to the achievements of resistance. The advocacy of the achievements of resistance is the result of an incomplete knowledge of life. When there has been a century of non-resistance, then the militarist can do what he wants the pacifist to do: live in history which is complete enough to warrant dogmatic conclusions. Until then, let him cease from sound and fury, for as Wilhelm Herzog, editor of *The Forum*, at Munich, said of the ninety-three German intellectuals who defended Germany: "They fancy they are all Ajaxes because they bray the loudest."

SHALL THE UNITED STATES JOIN A LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE?

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THE most far-reaching proposition of foreign policy which President Wilson has advanced he states somewhat as follows:

"What Europe is beginning to realize is that we are saving ourselves for something greater that is to come. We are saving ourselves in order that we may unite in that final league of nations in which it shall be understood that there is no neutrality where any nation is doing wrong, and which will show all mankind that no man may lead any nation into acts of aggression without having all the other nations of the world leagued against it."

This is in general the proposition of the League to Enforce Peace, formed about a year ago (1915), of which William Howard Taft is president and President Lowell, of Harvard, and President Hibben, of Princeton, are leading members.

There are certain obvious difficulties and objections to this League of Peace plan which do not seem to be sufficiently reckoned with. Some nations may enter the arbitration with the intention of rejecting any unfavorable decision and enforcing their claims by armed force. The plan gives no adequate guaranty of peace and will not make possible any real reduction of armaments. Nor would the nations so far surrender their sovereignty and independence as to agree either to submit to or abide by or await the results of the arbitration of every vital question on pain of general armed intervention. Neutrals cannot be depended upon to intervene in other parts of the world in cases in which they have no interest beyond the duty to preserve the peace. The intervention of neutrals, such as that of the United States, might not always secure an overwhelming preponderance of force on the side of law and order, but might simply result in other and more disastrous world wars.

Much as one may favor the ultimate confederation of

the nations of the world in a League to Enforce Peace, it is very far from certain that the time for the United States to join a European league will come at the end of the present war. The prospect is that the war will end, after the various nations are exhausted, in an armed truce, an armistice, to be broken again at a convenient season, when defeated or disappointed nations see their opportunity for revenge. It is not likely that the European nations will arrive at an equilibrium or *status quo* which will form the basis of an International League to Enforce Peace.

There will remain underlying group formations. As H. G. Wells points out, Germany will continue united with Austria-Hungary, unchanged in her essential attitude. In the face of a league of the central European powers there will be forced an absolutely necessary permanent alliance between France, Britain, Russia, Belgium, and Italy. These nations cannot think any longer of war among themselves. The necessity will be so urgent that they will be driven to set up some permanent conference or council for the direction and control of their joint international relationships and policies—fiscal, military, and naval.

But you ask, After the war is over, must the European nations simply fall back again into an armed peace, organized into two rival alliances with competing armaments? Can they not form a European partnership based on a recognition of public peace and equal rights? This remains to be seen. The German chancellor has recently declared that while Germany has never concealed her doubts whether peace could be guaranteed by international organizations, such as arbitration courts, she will be ready to consider the possibility of peaceful arrangements and understandings in answer to the cry that will ring out through the whole of humanity to prevent, so far as is within human power, the return of such a monstrous catastrophe.

But it seems probable that the nations will again fall back upon the balance of power. There will be no international police except as one group or set of nations organizes to keep down or regulate another rival group. A treaty could be made between such groups to submit all disputes to a process of arbitration or conciliation and to abstain from hostilities until such hearings had been completed. This would involve no provision for the enforcement of the submission of cases or the acceptances of awards. But, if voluntary, it might gradually develop into a powerful agency of peace. A European confederation might in time arise in which the united strength of a sufficient number of States would be available against any disturber of the public peace. If the various powers will severally and jointly guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of one another against forcible aggression or attack and establish a voluntary world court, this will be as far as it seems possible to go in the immediate future.

Other methods of eliminating some of the causes of war may be devised, such as an international protectorate over weak States like China and Mexico, which present the most serious questions in the future of world diplomacy. Any scheme looking to world organization must pay considerable attention to the development of international law, particularly to laying a basis for fair competition between rival nations in the development of

markets in backward and partially civilized countries. The present war is said to be at bottom a commercial war. Fear of unfair competition for the markets of Egypt, Morocco, Persia, Asia Minor, China, Congo, and Mexico is the cause most likely to result in future wars. The open door and equality of economic opportunities for the free development of the commerce of all nations must count more and more in the calculations of statesmen in removing the fundamental causes of war.

How will it help the cause of a durable peace for the United States to join either a pro-German or anti-German alliance or become entangled in European politics? Even if all the European countries should become parties to a league of peace, were we to join it we should live in constant apprehension of being drawn into disputes between European powers to compel one or the other to arbitrate its ambitions. We should have to prepare to face the constant menace of being a party to a world war. We don't want any excuse to intervene in Europe. If we do get into trouble it will probably be over some place like Mexico, or the Philippines, or the Panama Canal, or Venezuela, or our rights of commerce and passage on the high seas.

The United States owes a duty to civilization to continue our sensible policy of isolation, of minding our own business, of keeping ourselves clear of the hopeless animosities of war-ridden Europe. We must stay aloof from their hostilities, in which our power will count much more as a neutral than as a belligerent party. We shall have our hands full before long with the Monroe Doctrine, viz., that this hemisphere is not to be made a field for European aggression or intervention. In return we impliedly agree to protect the interests of honest investment and commerce in the weaker Latin American States. We forbid European intervention, but we impliedly guarantee to remove the cause by which it would be justified. So far circumstances have favored us and have enabled us to fulfill our pretensions (some may regard it as a gigantic bluff) that we are the policemen and if any regulating needs to be done we will do it. We impliedly assume to be responsible for the protection of trade and foreign capital and life in so far as they are entitled to protection in such countries. If we fail to do our duty, Europeans will sooner or later undertake the collection of claims on behalf of European creditors for themselves. They will insist on a right to occupy Mexico and collect her revenues, and this will lead to war with Europe.

If we really believe in a League to Enforce Peace we don't need to wait four or five years, until the end of the present European war. The Monroe Doctrine is one-sided and implies an extension of the sovereignty of the United States beyond its boundaries. The more evident this becomes the more it will be resented by Latin America. For this reason we need to cultivate Pan Americanism, leading to a partnership or cooperative agreement between the States of the Western Hemisphere. Thus America, instead of entangling herself in the complications of Europe, may develop an American league, protecting the American continent from aggression, keeping the peace between American countries, and obviating any occasion for armed intervention by European powers.

If intervention by the United States in Mexico becomes necessary, it might be carried out under the guid-

ance and upon the recommendations of a Pan American International Court or Council, after full opportunity for hearing by all parties concerned. In this way America could set an effective example in establishing international law and peace upon a solid foundation.

We might indeed become party to an alliance to be formed for keeping the peace and enforcing international law upon the high seas, where the questions involved concern all nations. If this marine league were formed first among a part of the nations, it might well draw to itself the cooperation of all. A voice in such an alliance for the government of the seas would seem far more desirable to Canada, Australia, and the United States than membership in a European league.

The logic of events would seem to indicate, therefore, that the next step toward world government will be a continuation of the several federations or alliances of existing powers, holding together as best they can to prevent aggression from without and disruption from within. Fear of war will continue to be the strongest incentive to a merger of nations into a supernational State. When we have developed a series of supernational governments and a sea government, each charged with some portion of the world's problems, these may evolve into the organs of a world State. A standing conference of these three or four greater States may become the nucleus of the ultimate world State or government, overriding dreams of national conquest, regulating armaments, keeping the peace, administering justice, creating political conditions which do full justice to the free development of all people on land and sea, and making the irresponsible and unauthorized resort to war a curiosity of ancient and primitive history. With Canadians and Australians and New Zealanders fighting and dying for the British Empire, it is reasonable to believe that national patriotism is capable of ultimate expansion to upholding an international union in a world government. Wars fought in that behalf would be worth fighting.

BRIEF PEACE NOTES

. . . *War and Peace*, the English periodical with which we are all familiar, presents in its December number a definite proposal. It points out that the proposal is not a plea for peace negotiations, for the early termination of the war, for an early, incomplete, or patched-up peace; it does not deny the necessity of a "knock-out blow," or of a "fight to a finish," or of the punishment of the Germans. The proposal reads:

"It is that now, during the course of the war, the Allies should decide between themselves, and if possible with the neutrals, at a new Paris Conference convened for that purpose, the character of the international arrangements by which, after this war, the rights and security of all nations—including the rights and security of Germany—are to be protected, and the peace of the world preserved, and should give as much publicity to their arrangements as was given to the commercial arrangements discussed at the Paris Conference early in the present year."

. . . Among the many responses to the President's note to the belligerents appears the following commendation from a sister neutral republic: "The most meritorious